In conclusion of the Main Committee for National Security of the US President Bill Clinton from November 1994, which was attended by Clinton’s highest associates, a decision was reached to start dialogue with Serbs from BiH. From the documents, it is indirectly evident that the Americans opted for this step unwillingly and under the pressure of the Europeans.
“At the same time as we defrost our contacts with the Bosnian Serbs, a map of the Contact Group remains the starting point for negotiations on territory. The Control Group could also informally consider the exchange of territory on the basis of mutual consent of the parties,” it was said in the document.
Further highlighted is not only the consent of the USA to enter the possible exchange of territory, but also that the “Control Group leaves on the table the option of connecting the Federation of BiH and the entity of the Bosnian Serbs with the neighbouring countries on the basis of equal treatment”.
Despite the fact that the USA were considering air strikes and land operation against the RS and even the attacks on Serbia in 1993, they agreed to major concessions to Serbs just one year later. This was also the basis for the plan 51:49 per cent by the Control Group.
In the part of the document that speaks of long-term measures in case, the RS does not accept the offered plan, it is highlighted that the air strikes and support to the Bosniak forces remain on the table in the period of up to two years, “after which the Bosnians (Bosniaks) would be left on their own”.
As it seems, the USA decided to accede to the Serbs due to increased internal pressure in the USA.
Namely, not long before the mentioned meeting, under the pressure of a part of the US congressmen, an amendment was adopted that foresaw the unilateral lifting of sanctions on weapons to the Bosniaks.
Clinton’s administration realized that the unilateral lifting of sanctions would expand the war and jeopardize the alliance with Europe, which at the time had the UN troops on the field.
“The Committee took note of the concern of the allies that the “Nunn-Mitchel” (the amendment on budget) is a step towards unilateral lifting of sanctions, which would have grave consequences for the alliance,” it was pointed out in the document.
It can be inferred from the mentioned document that the Americans were in a hurry to make Serbs accept at least some kind of a plan so that they would not end up in a situation where they have to unilaterally lift the embargo and practically jeopardize relations with Europe.
However, the USA never had the intention to genuinely support the Bosniaks. Probably the most important document ever published in relation to BiH is from the collection that was declassified in 2014, which refers to the transcript of the meeting held on February 5, 1993. This transcript is so important that it deserved to be published in its entirety.
At this meeting, military intervention against the Republika Srpska and direct support for the Bosniaks was discussed, within the implementation of the Vance-Owen plan. Then, according to the transcript, the US vice-president Al Gore entered the room.
“I do not agree (to the use of force). It is true that the world allowed a terrible thing to happen in BiH, but I have always been careful when it comes to the use of military force, just as I am sure that Bill Clinton will be, too”, Gore said. He further pointed out that there exists a tension between the word “consent” to an agreement and the word “forcing” to an agreement and that the USA should ask for its role in this “creative tension”.
“We should not be considering the willingness to use force. We bring the willingness of the world’s leading superpower to help reach a true agreement. We have a great opportunity to be the primary advocate for coalition that would be dominated by the Muslims. In this way, we would identify with the Muslim world in a creative way,” Gore said.
Further bellow, Gore pointed out that the objections of the Bosniaks on the Vance-Owen plan are legitimate, but that both Vance and Owen think that Bosniaks are opposing it just because they think that the USA will support them directly.
Secretary of State Warren Christopher indicated that even the best agreement would demand some sort of the use of force. Gore briefly replied that “the US people do not want us to send our boys there”.
The decision by the US Government to not engage militarily for the Bosniaks is brutally honestly confirmed in the document from the CIA collection from 2014 regarding March 1, 1993:
“Press Izetbegović to stay in New York for negotiations, convince the Bosnian government that the cavalry will not come and explain to them that the USA will work with the Bosnian government on reaching a better agreement, but the one that will not be their Muslim agreement”, it was stated in the document.
(Source: nezavisne.com)