Vranj: If Institutions Did Their Job Properly, the Ministry of Security Would Be Aware of the Camps

The narrative ranges from initial claims that the camps did not exist to court verdicts in Moldova. Moldovan camps near Banja Luka. The Hungarian Counter-Terrorism Center as well. Who is operating camps in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and for what purpose? What is legal and what is not? And what are domestic intelligence services doing?

Guests of the Plenum programme were Sandi Dizdarević, Edin Vranj and Darko Trifunović.

Vranj: An Attack on the Constitutional Order of Bosnia and Herzegovina Is Among the Gravest Criminal Offences

The Minister of Interior of the Bosnian-Podrinje Canton Goražde, Edin Vranj, placed primary responsibility on state-level institutions.

When commenting on claims that the Ministry of Security “has no knowledge” of the matter, Vranj described the issue as a dysfunction of the system.

“If state-level institutions were performing their duties properly, the Minister of Security would have the relevant information,” Vranj said, recalling that Bosnia and Herzegovina has the Service for Foreigners’ Affairs, the Intelligence-Security Agency, the Border Police and the State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA).

If each institution submitted information within its respective mandate, the umbrella institution, the Ministry of Security of Bosnia and Herzegovina, would have a complete overview, and there would be no “Rashomon-style interpretations, silence and public anxiety,” he stated.

He stressed that the matter does not concern minor violations.

“These are serious criminal offences, the most serious offences defined under the Criminal Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina, namely, an attack on the constitutional order and the sovereignty of the state,” he warned.

He added that such developments warrant the full attention of all security institutions, as well as the Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is competent to prosecute such activities.

“Unfortunately, we are witnessing silence and a lack of proactive action, at least based on what is, or is not, being communicated to the public,” he assessed.

Regarding international police cooperation, Vranj was explicit that it must take place exclusively at the state level.

“All international police cooperation must go through state authorities. This obligation is prescribed by the Constitution. Not everyone in this country can play with the Constitution and the law,” he said.

He emphasized that no centers or offices can be established without decisions by the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina and without the involvement of the Ministry of Security and the Directorate for Coordination of Police Bodies of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

“Lower levels of government cannot conclude agreements with other states. It must be interstate cooperation,” he said.

In the context of the establishment of the Hungarian Counter-Terrorism Centre in Banja Luka, Vranj said such a move is not a stabilizing factor.

“In my firm belief, this is unconstitutional, unlawful and detrimental to security. It is not a factor of stability, on the contrary, it may become a factor of instability,” he stressed.

Speaking about the future security of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the region, Vranj underlined that transparency and cooperation at the state level are essential.

“When the cards are put on the table and states cooperate with one another, there is nothing to hide. We are all involved, and we all have a shared interest,” he said.

He reminded that state-level bodies and operational groups for combating terrorism already exist, including prosecutors and institutions from across the country.

“That is how genuine cooperation is built,” he concluded.

He warned against shifting counter-terrorism efforts to lower levels of government.

“Imagine entrusting the fight against terrorism, one of the gravest criminal offences, to the lowest levels of authority. It is well known who cooperates with whom and at which level,” Vranj concluded.

Trifunović: The Region Is a Target of Hybrid Warfare – Institutions Paralyzed, Citizens Paying the Price

The Director of the Institute for National and International Security, Darko Trifunović, warned that countries in the region are exposed to strong hybrid influences, particularly through disinformation and foreign intelligence activities.

He stressed that the key problem lies in weak institutional responses, leaving security threats inadequately addressed.

“The entire region, unfortunately, lacks sufficient experts capable of conducting serious security threat assessments and clearly defining what exactly threatens our states.”

He warned of intensive Russian hybrid operations, particularly through disinformation campaigns.

“In Serbia, we uncovered an even more serious case, a network that disseminated around 240,000 pieces of fake news targeting Serbia. This demonstrates the scale of hybrid operations and attempts to influence society.”

He emphasized that this is an ongoing conflict that is not conducted through conventional means.

“I responsibly claim that Serbia is engaged in a form of conflict with the Russian Federation, as hybrid operations are being used to destabilize the country and influence political processes.”

He underlined that institutions are the key defence mechanism, but are often weakened or politically blocked.

“A state can respond to security threats only through its institutions. If those institutions are paralyzed, or honest professionals are sidelined, the system ceases to function, and citizens pay the price.”

He argued that Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina are among the primary targets of foreign influence.

“Russia has clearly identified Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina as key targets for advancing its interests, primarily to prevent these countries from joining the European Union and to keep them within its sphere of influence.”

He explained that such influence operates through political, economic and informational channels.

“When you combine energy leverage, political pressure, economic instruments and hundreds of organisations and media platforms operating outside institutional frameworks, it becomes clear how difficult it is for small states to resist.”

He warned that the region has become an open arena for competing foreign interests.

“We have become an open courtyard, accessible to anyone, from both East and West. This illustrates the weakness of our systems and the extent of our exposure.”

He stressed the need for security sector reform and institutional clarity.

“The security sector must sober up, either it works for the state, or there will be no state. It is a simple question of survival.”

He also referred to concrete examples of foreign-linked operations.

“There are cases where individuals are trained in the region and then sent to other countries to provoke incidents and destabilization. These are serious operations with international consequences.”

He stressed that security threats are often misinterpreted or downplayed in political discourse.

“We must distinguish between parallel structures and intelligence camps on the one hand, and official state institutions on the other. The problem is that these are often conflated and used for political purposes.”

He concluded that without a serious institutional response, effective protection against security threats is impossible.

“If you lack functional institutions and a clear strategy, you become vulnerable to external influence, and citizens are the most exposed.”

Dizdarević: It Is a Classic Military Camp – We Have Been Warning for Years, yet There Has Been No Response

Following court verdicts in Moldova that revealed details about the organization and content of the disputed training camps, where participants underwent training in drone operation and the handling of explosive devices, the question of their potential links to Bosnia and Herzegovina has once again been raised.

Professor of Criminal Psychology and security expert Sandi Dizdarević warns that this constitutes a serious threat which, he claims, has been highlighted for years without an adequate institutional response.

Speaking about the nature of such camps, Dizdarević stressed that these were not informal gatherings, but organized and systematic training programmes.

“This is extremely dangerous. Colleague Vranj, Professor Trifunović and I have been warning about this for some five years, not only in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also in Serbia and more broadly.”

He specified that such activities had a clear military structure and backing.

“This is a classic military camp in which members of the Wagner Group, linked to Russian military intelligence services, conducted training in military doctrines and concrete military operations involving the use of drones and explosive devices.”

As an illustration of the real danger, he referred to experiences from contemporary conflicts.

“How dangerous this is can be seen in the war that has been ongoing for several years in Ukraine.”

He particularly stressed that, despite numerous warnings, timely reactions from the competent authorities were absent.

“What pains me is that despite repeated warnings, we saw no reaction from state institutions, above all from the Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the State Investigation and Protection Agency.”

According to him, the focus is now on post-offence cooperation rather than preventive action.

“We are now speaking about post-offence cooperation following a first-instance verdict in order to determine whether any of our citizens were involved in the organization, whether there was sponsorship by certain state structures or individuals from state-owned companies, and this requires a comprehensive counter-intelligence operation.”

Asked what the Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina is specifically doing, Dizdarević said that key steps should follow through international cooperation and data exchange.

“Through operational police data exchange and international legal assistance, certain pieces of evidence should be shared, which will likely open a new dimension of investigation concerning the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.”

He also recalled that the camp in Glamočani is not an isolated case and that information about similar locations across the region has existed for years.

He stressed that he and his colleagues had continuously warned about such developments.

“Those who follow this field, particularly colleague Trifunović and I, have for years warned about camps ranging from Zlatibor to Sunčana Rijeka, to the so-called Humanitarian Centre in Niš, as well as individuals linked both to the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska. Unfortunately, there has never been a reaction.”

Speaking about institutional responsibility, Dizdarević said he views the Prosecutor’s Office as the final instance in the chain.

“I would position the Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina at the top of the pyramid, responsible for prosecution on the basis of information gathered by the various police and intelligence structures mentioned by colleague Vranj.”

The key problem, he argues, lies in the absence of a strong counter-intelligence structure.

“There is one crucial issue, the lack of a strong sector or agency whose primary mandate would be counter-intelligence activity.”

He also recalled the legal competences of the State Investigation and Protection Agency.

“The State Investigation and Protection Agency was designed and established modeled on the FBI, as an administrative organization with independent police-operational authority. Among other responsibilities, it gathers intelligence related to criminal offences and perpetrators falling under the jurisdiction of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina.”

Finally, he stressed that the potential establishment and organization of such camps would constitute a criminal offence.

“If the establishment of a camp and military or police-style training is contrary to the regulations at the level of Bosnia and Herzegovina, then it constitutes a criminal offence falling within the jurisdiction of the intelligence, or criminal-intelligence, department of the State Investigation and Protection Agency.”, Federalna writes.

 

 

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