One of the most striking parts of the “Dobanovci Minutes” refers to the open disagreement in Milošević’s and Karadžić’s views on the further direction of the war. Their discussion indicates that in late August, 1995, there was no debate about how to achieve war goals, but how to handle their obvious failure.
Karadžić continued to discuss the possibility of continuing with resistance, attempting to convince everyone present that the political and military situation could change in favor of Republika Srpska. This approach shows that part of the leadership in Pale was not ready to accept that international circumstances, military balance of forces, and political pressures had irreversibly changed the course of the war.
“We need living people, not history”
On the contrary, Milošević had a more pragmatic approach. His stances did not come from reconsideration of the policy that led to war and mass crimes, but from an assessment that continuation of the aggression cannot bring political benefit. In that context, he pronounced a sentence that became one of the most notable from the entire “Dobanovci Minutes”: “We need living people, not the history.”
At first glance, this statement can create the impression of a call to preserving life and ending war. However, when observed in the context of the entire meeting, it primarily reflects the pragmatic assessment of political opportunities. Nowhere in the discussion did Milošević question the policy preceding that moment or mention responsibility for crimes committed during aggression. His argument focused on the fact that the political and military situation changed the course of events to the extent that the war became unbearable. It is also important to point out that he was thinking of Serbian people, but not the people who suffered the consequences of Serbian aggression and genocide.
“The Dobanovci Minutes” is proof that the Serbian decision to accept the peaceful process resulted from a changed balance of power on the ground and stronger international pressure, not themoral or political reconsideration of the war policy up to that point. In that regard, the discussion between Milošević and Karadžić represents a sort of turning point, when political pragmatism starts to suppress earlier maximalist war goals.
Military Leadership on the Realistic Situation on the Ground
One of the greatest historical values of the “Dobanovci Minutes” is that, despite political stances, it also contains assessments by top military officials about the realistic situation on the battlefield. Contrary to public rhetoric about decisiveness and readiness to continue the battle, closed-door talks paint a completely different picture: an army exhausted by years of war, a serious lack of manpower and logistical supplies, and diminishing opportunities for organizing an efficient defence.
General Zdravko Tolimir, the Assistant Commander of the Main Staff of the VRS for Security, warned about this, emphasizing: “Only 20 percent of military-aged Serbs are fighting the war in the former Bosnia and Herzegovina. The rest are either abroad, with Alija, or fled to the FRY.
This assessment is one of the most direct acknowledgments of the severe demographic and military exhaustion within Republika Srpska. After more than three years of war, the mobilization potential had been severely compromised, significantly limiting further military operations. A similar assessment was made by General Milan Gvero, who warned: “The situation is difficult. The army does not have the strength to withstand the pressure for more than 20 days. If we withstand that much, we will be ‘on the horse.’ That is why we should go for a peaceful solution.” His words confirm that part of the military leadership had already considered that continuation of the war no longer had a realistic military basis. At the same time, they showed that the decision to accept peace agreements was not the result of a changed stance towards committed crimes or civilian suffering, but a consequence of the assessment that political and military goals could no longer be realized on the battlefield.
Behind the public rhetoric about continuing the fight, the political leadership was forced to make decisions in circumstances where even the highest military commanders were aware that the possibility of a military turnaround was almost exhausted.
Accepting Peace without Facing Responsibility
The assessments by the senior officers in Dobanovci were not without a political undertone. During the discussion, it became obvious that some of the top military leadership of Republika Srpska also accepted that continuing the war no longer had any real basis. Particularly significant in this context is the stance of VRS Main Staff Commander Ratko Mladić, who voted for a peaceful solution and supported the formation of a unified negotiating delegation led by Belgrade.
His statement that he is “personally voting for peace” is the best indicator of how much political and military circumstances had changed compared to the previous years of war. However, such an attitude should not be interpreted as a reconsideration of the prior policy. On the contrary, the content of the entire meeting shows that accepting peace was a consequence of the changed balance of power, not the readiness to speak about responsibility for war, mass crimes, and genocide committed against Bosniaks.
The Chief of the VJ General Staff, Momčilo Perišić, also warned of the potential consequences of continuing the aggression. Speaking about the future of the Bosnian Serbs, he expressed fear that they might become “not only Palestinians, but Kurds,” pointing to the danger of long-term political isolation and a loss of prospects. This statement also confirms that the leadership of the political and military structures was already seriously considering the consequences of continuing the war, but, above all, through a prism of personal political interests.
The final part of the discussion leaves a strong impression. While participants spoke about peace, negotiations, and future political solutions, there was almost no word about thousands of murdered victims, mass exiles, concentration camps, or genocide in Srebrenica committed a few weeks before. That silence is not accidental. It represents one of the most striking indicators of political logic which dominated the meeting – human suffering was overshadowed by discussions about territories, military capacities, and negotiating positions.
In a historiographical sense, this fact gives the “Dobanovci Minutes” its special value. The document not only testifies to how the conversation led to the termination of the war, but also to what was left unsaid. Sometimes, unspoken topics are an equally important historical source as spoken words.
Serbian Orthodox Church as Part of Political Dialogue
One of the less analyzed but historically significant aspects of the meeting in Dobanovci is the presence of the head of the Serbian Orthodox Church, Patriarch Pavle, and Bishop Irinej Bulović. Their participation shows that in the final stages of the war, at a moment of serious political disagreements between Belgrade and the leadership of Republika Srpska, there was an attempt to further include the authority of the Serbian Orthodox Church in the process of political agreement and the acceptance of new circumstances.
In his address, Patriarch Pavle called for overcoming divisions and accepting the circumstances that emerged after the change in the military balance of power. Bishop Irinej Bulović, using biblical examples, tried to justify the need for a realistic assessment of their capabilities and the acceptance of a peaceful settlement.
The content of the ‘Dobanovci Minutes’ shows that the role of the Serbian Orthodox Church at this meeting was above all directed to political mediation and an attempt to preserve the unity of the Serbian political leadership at a moment when it was obvious that the war was nearing its end. At the same time, this part of the conversation does not raise the question of war crimes or the suffering of the civilian population, which further confirms the defining characteristic of the entire meeting.
A Document Transcending Time
The ‘Dobanovci Minutes’ is one of the most significant primary sources for understanding the final stage of the Serbian aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Their value does not stem solely from the fact that they record the conversation between the top political and military leadership of the FRY and Republika Srpska, but above all because they provide a direct insight into the way in which decision-makers assessed the military situation, political possibilities, and the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina at a moment when their political and military project up to that point was in a serious crisis.
Unlike public speeches and political statements, which were often tailored for propaganda purposes, this document emerged as an internal record of a conversation conducted behind closed doors. It does not show what the political leadership wanted the public to hear, but what it said while assessing the actual situation on the battlefield and seeking an exit from an increasingly unfavorable political and military situation.
Analysis of the ‘Dobanovci Minutes’ content confirms that the core of the conversation was dominated by questions of territory, military exhaustion, international pressure, and negotiating positions. At the same time, any discussion of civilian victims, mass crimes, and the genocide in Srebrenica—committed just a few weeks prior—is entirely absent. That silence is not insignificant. On the contrary, it represents one of the strongest indicators of the political logic that marked the final stage of the war. While the consequences of this policy were visible on the ground through thousands of murdered, exiled, and missing persons, in Dobanovci they mostly discussed political consequences, military opportunities, and future negotiations.
“The Dobanovci Minutes” often transcends the significance of standard meeting minutes. It represents a testimony to a style of political decision-making in which territorial and political interests were often prioritized over human lives and international law. As such, it remains an indispensable source for historiographical research of aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and genocide against Bosniaks.
At a time when both the international and domestic public face increasing attempts to relativize or negate the judicially established facts about the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the significance of these documents becomes even greater. They make it possible to speak about the past on the basis of authentic sources created at the time decisions were made, rather than on subsequent political interpretations or revisionist constructions. That is why the ‘Dobanovci Minutes’ remain a document of lasting historical value – not only as a testimony to one meeting held in August 1995, but as a source that contributes to the understanding of the political processes that marked the final stage of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
