When, last month, a group of defence experts gathered in Whitehall, the seat of the United Kingdom (UK) government, to discuss how prepared the UK and its allies are for a war they believe could break out in the next few years, their conclusion was rather bleak: they are not ready.
Those gathered at the conference, organized by the London-based research centre the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), were not warmongers; they were people in the know. Current and former members of the armed forces, government and NATO officials, researchers, and defence industry experts whose thinking is based on a widely accepted intelligence assessment that Russia is preparing for the possibility of a direct conflict with Europe.
The only way to prevent this, they say, is to ensure that, if war breaks out, Europe will win.
Greater investment in Europe’s chronically underfunded defence is crucial, but security experts are increasingly warning that a major shift in mindset across all areas is also needed. The time has come, they say, for European governments to involve their citizens and clearly make it known that the time when Europe could ignore the threat of war has passed.
“I think there are indications that societies are ready for this conversation, but I also think we are seeing governments that are still not confident enough to have that conversation with their public,” said Sam Greene, professor of Russian politics at King’s College London and an expert on democratic resilience.
There is a growing consensus among experts that Russia is already waging a hybrid war against the West by carrying out sabotage operations and injecting chaos and disinformation into domestic political debates. They point to overwhelming evidence, including repeated incursions by Russian aircraft and drones into NATO airspace and GPS interference in the Baltic states, to disinformation campaigns and sabotage attacks on critical infrastructure in multiple countries that are linked to Russian intelligence services. Russia has consistently denied involvement.
Greene said that these attacks have already changed attitudes among many in Europe, even if some politicians are still reluctant to directly label them as hybrid warfare.
“I think people are scared, especially as this becomes more visible,” he said. “We see drones in front of airports, and I think there is a growing sense that it is probably just a matter of time before one of these drones brings down an aircraft.”
Baltic fears
Although Moscow has not carried out any direct attacks on NATO allies in Europe – experts say this is partly because Russia knows it could not defeat the alliance with its current capabilities – there are increasing signs that this could change in the future.
NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte warned earlier this year that Russia could be ready to use military force against NATO within five years. German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul reiterated that warning in a speech last month, saying that German intelligence services believe Moscow “is keeping open at least the option of war against NATO by 2029 at the latest.”
Russian President Vladimir Putin stated in early December that, although Russia does not plan to wage war with Europe, “if Europe suddenly wants to fight us and starts, we are ready immediately.”
The consensus among the Baltic states is that an attack on them could come as early as three years from now. When researchers from the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School examined warnings and predictions by various officials about Russia’s readiness and willingness to launch a war against NATO, they found that the years most frequently mentioned were 2027 and 2028.
Recognizing this threat has led NATO to develop contingency plans to defend against possible Russian aggression in the Baltic.
But experts warn that the alliance’s plans do not match reality.
“There is a plan, with numbers. But governments are not taking the necessary steps to implement it. We are still planning based on things that do not exist,” said Jack Watling, a senior research fellow at RUSI. He highlighted the risk of trying to structure a defensive response based on a wish list rather than reality, instead of accepting available resources and planning on that basis.
Realignments in the UK
The UK government earlier this year asked three well-known experts – former NATO chief George Robertson, General Richard Barrons, former head of the Joint Forces Command, and Fiona Hill, a former senior director at the United States (U.S.) National Security Council – to conduct a strategic review of UK defence. The troika presented a manual on the steps needed to prepare for war.
Speaking at a RUSI event last month, Barrons said the UK must review the resilience of its infrastructure, build up its armed forces, reserves and civil defence, and invest in health, industry and the economy, to enable a swift transition to wartime.
“Honestly, we don’t need much more analysis to know what to do. The problem is that we actually have to do it,” he said. As the reason for the lack of haste, he pointed out that “civil society and our politicians” have other concerns.
Although the UK is moving in the right direction, he said, at the current pace it would take the country about 10 years to be ready for war.
“Our analyses and our allies are telling us, well, maybe you have three to five years… so this is a matter of will, social as much as political, and then competence. Maybe we have to do better,” he said.
Dividend of peace
Many European capitals, including London, have spent the last few decades barely thinking about defence. With no major direct military conflicts on the continent since 1945, Europe has enjoyed the longest period of uninterrupted peace in recent centuries.
These decades of relative peace brought significant peace dividends. Successive governments have been able to spend money on welfare instead of defence, making the lives of ordinary Europeans much more comfortable, while relying on the U.S., the world’s biggest military spender, to come to the rescue if needed.
Then came two harsh awakenings: the U.S. president, Donald Trump, who made it clear to NATO allies that they could no longer rely so heavily on the U.S., and the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine.
This disruption of the status quo prompted most European NATO members to increase defence spending. According to NATO data, 31 of the 32 members will meet the 2% GDP defence target this year – compared to just six in 2021, the year before Russia began its invasion. Iceland, a founding member of NATO and the only country not predicted to achieve this goal, has no armed forces of its own. Instead, it contributes financially, civilian personnel, and air defence and surveillance systems.
NATO members agreed in June to increase the target to 5% of GDP by 2035. However, many analysts are sceptical about this goal – especially since most European countries are facing financial pressures even without contemplating massive increases in their military spending.
Explaining to voters that some resources may need to be reallocated and that more people may need to serve in reserve or regular forces is not something most politicians want to do.
Several Eurobarometer surveys, which measure public opinion across the European Union (EU), have shown this year that the vast majority of Europeans – 78% – are worried about the defence and security of the EU in the next five years. A third of people think that defence should be among the bloc’s spending priorities.
However, General Fabien Mandon, the head of the French armed forces, caused an outcry last month when he warned the French public that the country must prepare for possible future losses against Russian aggression, saying that France must “accept the loss of its children” in order to “protect what we are.”
A real threat in the Baltics
Robin Potter, an academic fellow at the UK think tank Chatham House, said that people’s readiness across Europe to understand the threat – and to participate in countering it – varies significantly.
“If you’re in the east, if you’re bordering Russia perhaps, if you’re in Poland or the Baltic states, the threat is very real for people there, and they are taking many more steps in terms of public shelters because they believe the risk of an airstrike is higher,” he said.
Sweden and Finland last year updated guidance for their citizens on how to survive a war, distributing brochures that included instructions on how to prepare for communication blackouts, power outages, and extreme weather conditions. Several countries, including Lithuania, Latvia, and Sweden, have reintroduced conscription in the past decade, while others, such as Germany, Poland, Belgium, Romania, and Bulgaria have introduced voluntary military training programmes for their citizens.
Potter said that citizens who have greater trust in their country’s institutions are more likely to accept sacrifices for the greater good.
“If people feel that the government is working for them, they are probably more inclined to want to give something in return,” he said. He singled out the Nordic countries, which consistently rank highly in terms of social assistance, happiness and well-being, and where the concepts of civic duty and “total defence” – in which every citizen, company and public body becomes part of the war effort when necessary – are deeply rooted.
“I think the question is whether that model can simply be applied in a very different society with very low trust in public institutions compared to that, such as the UK,” he added.
