While Donald Trump’s first term was “relatively uneventful” concerning Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), this time it might not be the same, writes political analyst Jasmin Mujanovic. He predicts that his administration might seek some form of “deal” in the Balkans, and if it fails regarding Kosovo, it could turn to BiH. However, it’s unclear what that would entail, as it depends on what Trump and those around him “see” in BiH – and given Trump’s unpredictability, “all options are on the table.”
The end of the modern “European project”
According to Mujanovic, the crucial question for the region and Europe as a whole is whether Trump will genuinely abandon Ukraine, and if he does, in what form.
“Trump and his circle are entirely transactional in their concept of foreign relations, so everything depends on where they see a better ‘deal.’ Russia will undoubtedly make an offer; it likely already has,” he writes.
He also mentions that it is unclear how credible Trump’s threats to withdraw from NATO are, and if he is serious, then Ukraine’s chances against Russia “drop to almost zero.”
“This would also mean the end of the modern ‘European project’ as we know it. A new ‘iron wall’ will fall across the continent, and the ‘old’ capitals, Berlin and Paris, will be blamed – and rightfully so –by former Eastern allies. They won’t surrender to Moscow, as they know the weight of the Russian boot. German and French strategic provincialism could kill off the last remnants of the ‘Euro-Atlantic’ order,” he writes.
Mujanovic notes that if the worst happens, “European cohesion, which has always been more of a slogan than a reality, will completely fragment, leaving us with a series of opposing alliances reminiscent of the ‘Little Entente’ style.”
He predicts that in that case, several blocs are likely to form in the broader eastern part of Europe.
“Some will undoubtedly lean towards Russia, while others may look toward Turkey (and not necessarily just countries with Muslim-majority populations). Few will look to the ‘failed powers’ in Paris and Berlin,” he writes.
Uncertainty for BiH
Mujanovic believes it’s unclear how Trump’s administration’s appetite for a “deal” will align with the government of Kosovo led by Prime Minister Albin Kurti, which remains popular and came to power largely due to its strong opposition to initial proposals for “territory swaps.” Thus, he wonders if Kurti might provide a “convincing counter-offer.”
As for the other “major conflict point” in the region, BiH, Mujanovicpoints out that Trump’s first term was “relatively uneventful.”
However, he emphasizes that this time, things might be different.
“If Richard Grenell and others want a Balkan deal and can’t achieve it in Kosovo, they will turn to BiH. Especially with the 30th anniversary of Dayton in 2025,” he predicts.
Mujanovic argues that Biden has been “a disaster for BiH” and that his term has been marked by “the most significant increase in sectarianism since the original Dayton Agreement.”
He mentions that the major unknown regarding potential involvement by Trump’s White House in BiH if it happens at all, is what he and his people “see” in BiH.
“Possibilities range from atavistic Islamophobia, which could provide a significant boost to the Serbian secessionist regime in Banja Luka, with which Grenell already has (in)direct ties via Vucic, to a package of constitutional reforms that might be mild in content yet allow the White House the headlines Trump desires. If Trump and his team see Dayton as a Democratic project, they might try to dismantle it entirely. What that might look like is hard to predict. It’s too early to forecast the substance of any such ‘reforms,’ but as with everything Trump does: all options are on the table, truly, on all axes,” writes Mujanovic.
“Agent of chaos”
He further notes that, at the macro level, Biden’s policy toward the Western Balkans has been “so disappointing that it’s easy to say, ‘it can’t get worse.’”
“But, of course, it can. Whether it will, however, remains uncertain. Trump is an agent of chaos, acting on fleeting, self-serving impulses. They cannot be predicted in the real sense because they depend on the whims of one man,” writes Mujanovic.
In conclusion, he points out that all of this depends on “the degree of chaos and crisis that follows within the United States (U.S.) itself.”
He explains that there are now far fewer safeguards for preserving constitutional order and democracy than there were in 2016, and Trump’s opposition is also significantly weaker.
Trump is also bolstered. His victory this time around is far more convincing than in 2016, and he is surrounded by true loyalists and hardliners. According to Mujanovic, the “grown-ups in the room” in the U.S. have long since disappeared, and those remaining with Trump are on a mission to “(re)shape” the U.S. How that will manifest and how the U.S. public will react remains to be seen. Depending on the results of the Congressional elections, he may be somewhat “restricted,” but even that seems increasingly unlikely. However, Mujanovic assesses that if Trump enacts his trade policy and it “throws the U.S. economy into crisis,” he might already be “written off” by 2026.
“But again, Trump is an agent of chaos. And the thing with chaos is that it is, by definition, unpredictable. Violence has once again become a prominent feature of U.S. life and politics. The U.S. public may have overlooked January 6th, perhaps even the repeated assassination attempts on Trump himself – it’s unclear based on available data – but the spirit of violence has now evidently been let out of the bottle. And it will continue seeping into the fabric of this country, poisoning its core. It might initially seem uneventful, but soon, the vital organs of constitutional democracy and the rule of law could simply fail,” writes Mujanovic.
“Slowly, and then suddenly, a once-powerful republic is destroyed by chaos and violence, and with it, the world it built after 1945 will be left in ruins,” he adds.
