The PIC has failed to reach an agreement. Christian Schmidt’s successor has not been elected; the decision has been postponed. Furthermore, the non-election of the US-backed candidate, Antonio Zanardi Landi, has opened up the possibility of a US withdrawal from the PIC. What lies behind the message from the US Embassy regarding a reevaluation of their presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina? Can this crisis between the American and European partners jeopardize the functioning of the OHR, or is it merely a tactical move to exert additional pressure on European partners? Let us recall that Zanardi Landi is European, just like René Troccaz—he simply comes from Italy.
The diplomatic dispute between the United States and the Europeans over the appointment of the new Head of the OHR did not remain confined to the circle of PIC member states. The disagreement has become public, direct, and politically serious. At midnight, Washington, citing a lack of support for its preferred candidate Landi, issued a warning:
“The United States takes note of the European failure to reach a consensus around a European candidate and is disappointed that these divisions have prevented the PIC from fulfilling its duty. European indecisiveness and the PIC’s abandonment of its own duty toward Bosnia and Herzegovina are forcing the United States to reevaluate its role in the current international presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina.”
The Americans did not specify a timeframe for when such a decision might be implemented if European partners—primarily France and Germany—choose to back their own proposal instead of the US-supported option, meaning if they refuse to withdraw Troccaz’s candidacy. Brussels also reacted with a joint message:
“The European Union member states within the Peace Implementation Council Steering Board believe that, in accordance with past practice, the new High Representative should come from an EU member state. We are determined to bridge the differences regarding a candidate who is able to cooperate with all actors in implementing the mandate of the High Representative, including domestic actors. We will continue intensive consultations in the coming days and stand ready to meet again with our partners within the Steering Board to finalize the appointment process soon.”
The strength of the High Representative does not lie exclusively in the Bonn Powers, but rather in the political support of those standing behind him—which is now in question. Is this a crisis that could jeopardize the international oversight model, a matter of negotiating pressure, or is Europe using tactical delays in a diplomatic struggle for power positioning?
“From my perspective, regardless of their threats to withdraw, the US cannot leave the Peace Implementation Council if they truly want to channel their influence in the desired direction—namely, resolving the state property issue in a way that aligns with the perception within certain structures of the current administration,” believes Sead Turčalo, Dean of the Faculty of Political Sciences in Sarajevo.
“They have their own reasons, so first and foremost, this represents a change in US foreign policy and their core objectives. It is also a shift toward what is known as transactional foreign policy, where economic and geostrategic interests cross and are pursued exclusively in accordance with American interests, while the interests of European allies are sidelined and not as important,” emphasizes Neven Anđelić, Professor of International Relations at Regent’s University London.
BiH has become a new flashpoint of US-European competition, making the consequences highly uncertain should the US decide to say “no” to the PIC and, by extension, the OHR—especially considering that this Office functions thanks to the joint political authority of the West. If a consensus is not reached in this election, a lack of support from either the US or the EU could leave BiH with a High Representative of questionable authority and a significantly weakened OHR.
“It will more or less lead to a mandate similar to that of the previous High Representative, Valentin Inzko, where the High Representative will express concern rather than actually having real mechanisms or possibilities for action; therefore, he will be limited in that sense. But even otherwise—if the US proposal for High Representative were to be appointed—he would not have full support. So, what is in the balance here is whose support is actually more important,” adds Turčalo.
However, it is vital to both sides that the decision on the new High Representative be reached by consensus, an objective that will be pursued until the end of June.
