Austrian official Arnold Kammel made a statement that “EUFOR is no longer guaranteed” which is not only a technical remark about a single international mission, but it raises a more serious question: what if the EUFOR mandate, annually renewed in the UN Security Council, simply fails to pass?
This would make Bosnia and Herzegovina step out of the “post-Dayton stability” framework and return to the zone of security uncertainty. The signing of the peace agreement thirty years ago was meant to lead the country out of this zone, at least on paper.
Kammel’s statement was made in the context of a possible redirection of American engagement in international missions.
“There are constant rumors about a reorganization of the US,” he said. He mentioned Bosnia and Herzegovina immediately after.
Austria, which will next year take over the command of EUFOR, plans to increase the number of soldiers. The key message does not lie in numbers. “Until now, the extension of the mandate has been successful, but at this unpredictable time, the success is no longer guaranteed,” Kammel warned.
EUFOR Becomes Visible when Its Future Becomes Questionable
EUFOR at that moment stops being routine. A mission that has for years operated as an almost invisible mechanism of post-conflict stabilization becomes visible at the exact moment when its future becomes uncertain.
Its survival is no longer a technical matter, but also a political and security issue. This issue is directly tied to relations between major powers, the possibility of a Russian veto in the UN and a question about Europe’s readiness to take responsibility for its own immediate neighborhood.
That change is not a surprise. There were warnings, ever since the early Russian invasion of Ukraine, that Bosnia and Herzegovina could become an additional pressure point.
Davor Gjenero, political scientist, back then said that “now begins a chapter in which the NATO Alliance will have a major responsibility to engage both militarily and politically in Bosnia and Herzegovina.”
Dejan Jović warned that “It is possible to further destabilize the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia through ethnic and revisionist narratives.”
“Today, over four years later, those estimates no longer sound like a forecast, but as a description of reality.”
Language of Deterrence
Bosnia and Herzegovina is not at war or on the verge of war, but the political crisis is increasingly treated as a security risk. The language reveals this.
Instead of using bureaucratic language, European officials and EUFOR are more open about “credible presence,” “deterrence,” and “institutional resilience.” This is not empty political rhetoric, but an alarm that every serious destabilization carries clear international consequences. The choice of words changed because the assessment of risk changed.
The EUFOR Commander, Major General Maurizio Fronda, stressed that “close cooperation between EUFOR and NATO is central to maintaining stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina.”
Political Message Issued by Europe
The European Foreign Policy Chief, Kaja Kallas, said in Sarajevo that “any attempts to fracture the country are unacceptable.” She described the moves made by the leadership of Republika Srpska entity of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a threat to constitutional and legal order.
According to her, the reinforcement of EUFOR sends a clear message that the EU remains firmly devoted to stability in this region and to the security of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Therefore, EUFOR is both a military mission and a political instrument. A message to domestic politicians is that destabilization has limits. A message to Moscow is that a security vacuum in Bosnia and Herzegovina will not be tolerated. A message to Washington is that Europe no longer can, and probably won’t, rely on the US as an automatic guarantee.
NATO – a Backup Plan
The possibility of NATO taking the role of EUFOR is nothing new. This possibility was discussed in 2022, when concerns arose over a potential Russian veto in the UN Security Council.
The former representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina to NATO, Alija Kožljak, estimated in the analysis conducted by the European Western Balkans portal that there is “a big chance” that NATO could replace EUFOR in the event of a Russian veto on mandate extension.
Back then, he described the security situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a state “threatened by a combination of internal and external factors which showed potential of acting together.”
On the other hand, Miloš Šolaja, using the same analysis, warned that peace and security in Bosnia and Herzegovina depend on “stabilization of domestic politics” and on reaching agreement on key matters.
“If that does not happen then there will be a never-ending uncertainty that no armed force could prevent, neither internal nor foreign,” Šolaja warned.
EUFOR – Not a Problem, but a Symptom
Here lies the key paradox. The presence of EUFOR both calms the situation and reveals its weak spot.
If thirty years after the war it still takes an international military mission to serve as a deterrence factor, this says a lot, not about the mission, but about the system which made it permanent.
Therefore EUFOR is not a problem, but a symptom.
EUFOR is a symptom of the country where political crises re-emerge, secession threats are normalized, and where the decisions by state institutions are systematically challenged. In such an environment, international presence remains what it is – both criticized, and quietly accepted as the final security guarantee.
For this reason the Austrian warning is not only news about one mission. It is a signal that Europe no longer wants to wait for a political crisis to become a security crisis.
The question that arises is not only whether EUFOR remains, but what remains if it leaves, N1 writes.
