Current geopolitical circumstances in the world and conditions in the Western Balkans provide an ideal opportunity for Russian efforts to undermine Euro-Atlantic integration in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), warns foreign policy journalist and founder of the Initiative for Strategic Analyses, Harun Karcic. He believes that Russian actions in this regard could come in the form of a “false flag operation” aimed at the secession of the BiH entity Republika Srpska (RS), emphasizing that this could set a “dangerous precedent for other frozen conflicts in Europe.”
Karcic writes that Russia illegally and deliberately intervened in recent presidential elections in Moldova and may even be “laying the groundwork for a false flag operation” in the Moldovan region of Transnistria, providing a pretext for an invasion of that country. “Russia is clearly ready to destabilize its neighbors to expand its sphere of influence,” he states.
He warns that Moscow could easily adapt this broader strategy to the Western Balkans, particularly BiH, one of the most politically unstable countries in the region.
Karcic assumes that such efforts would be focused on the BiHentity RS, “where secessionist ambitions are constantly woven into political discourse.” He emphasizes that “a well-executed Russian false flag operation could serve as an excuse to destabilize BiH and pave the way for the declaration of RS‘sindependence, turning it into a satellite akin to Abkhazia or South Ossetia in Georgia.”
Undermining Euro-Atlantic integration
Karcic explains that Russian strategic interests in the Balkans revolve around undermining Euro-Atlantic integration while maintaining influence in a region historically connected to Slavic and Orthodox cultures.
BiH‘s aspirations for NATO and European Union (EU)membership are particularly problematic for Moscow, which views such moves as encroachments on its sphere of influence.
Karcic identifies the role of RS President Milorad Dodik in these Russian efforts, noting that during his de facto 16-year rule, Dodik has frequently mentioned secession, using the entity’s significant autonomy to resist centralization efforts and closely align with Belgrade and Moscow’s interests.
He also states that Dodik’s “criminal ties and business relationships with Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic and other pro-Russian Serbian politicians, as well as underground networks in Montenegro and Kosovo, are well known and well documented.”
“Dodik himself boasts of having met Russian President Vladimir Putin more than ten times and has continuously defied the authority of Christian Schmidt, the appointed High Representative for BiH, who is responsible for overseeing the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement,” he writes.
Deception in the Balkans
Karcic believes there is potential for a “highly concerning” scenario – “Russia could carry out a false flag operation, creating the illusion of a crisis that requires the unilateral declaration of RS‘s independence, all while maintaining plausible deniability.”
He assumes that the target of such a false flag operation could be a “symbolically significant locality or community within RS,” potentially involving “ethnically mixed areas” and cities such as Brcko, where Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks live together. Alternatively, it could manifest as an attack (framed as terrorism) on key infrastructure such as bridges, transport hubs, or government buildings.
“Moreover, targeting critical economic infrastructure, such as energy pipelines or trade routes, and blaming Bosniak-Muslim or Croatian elements could portray RS as an economically besieged entity. Russia could then step in with economic assistance and recognition, similar to its actions in Abkhazia and South Ossetia,” he writes.
He also states that radical nationalist groups or extremist organizations with ties to Belgrade or other external forces could target “emotionally sensitive locations such as Srebrenica,” where genocide was committed in 1995.
For example, these groups could carry out an attack on Bosniak returnees in that town or strike a local mosque, which would be enough to provoke Bosniaks into launching retaliatory attacks against Serbs in Muslim-majority areas, Karcic writes, adding that this would spark “violence that would quickly spiral out of control in a country where almost every household has an automatic rifle buried in the backyard.”
Another possible false flag operation could involve “covert Russian operatives or local proxies staging an attack and attributing it to Bosniak Muslim extremists.”
“This narrative could exploit the existing Islamophobic hatred among Bosnian Serbs towards Bosniak Muslims, portraying the Serbian entity as under siege and its independence as a necessary measure to protect its people,” he writes.
“Russia’s extensive disinformation apparatus would likely amplify this false narrative. Pro-Russian media active in the Balkans, as well as social media bots and influencers, would spread fake evidence of Bosniak aggression or Western complicity. Meanwhile, Russian officials could use diplomatic channels to cast doubt on the credibility of BiH‘s institutions and NATO’s intentions,” he adds.
An ideal opportunity for manipulation
Karcic assumes that after a staged attack, RS authorities would likely “declare a state of emergency, mobilize their security forces, establish solid borders along the existing invisible entity division line, and proclaim independence.”
“Russia, leveraging its position in the United Nations (UN)Security Council, could block any resolutions condemning RSwhile extending ‘humanitarian’ support to the entity. Given Russia’s strong presence in neighboring Serbia – particularly through its ‘humanitarian center’ in Nis (which the United States (U.S.) considers a spy hub) – this would be relatively easy to execute, considering that RS shares a 302-kilometer-long border with Serbia,” he writes.
Karcic stresses that several preconditions would need to be met for such a plan to succeed.
The first and most important condition is weak state institutions and a fragmented governance framework in BiH, “characterized by competing ethnic agendas and under-resourced central governments,” which provides fertile ground for manipulation.
Second, there is significant distrust among Bosnian Serbs toward the international community, especially NATO, foreign embassies in Sarajevo, and the Office of the High Representative (OHR). Karcic writes that Russia could exploit this distrust to fuel discontent among RS‘s leaders, potentially destabilizing the region.
Third, there must be local proxies – “little green men,” as seen in Crimea – and Karcic assesses that there are already plenty in the country: “In RS, there are well-connected pro-Russian biker gangs, local branches of the Night Wolves, criminal networks, and paramilitary units often linked to veterans’ associations. These could serve as enforcers after a false flag operation.”
Finally, there must be global distractions: parallel global crises, such as heightened tensions in Ukraine or the Middle East, which would divert Western attention and resources away from the Balkans.
“All of this is currently in place,” he warns.
Who would respond?
The international response to a false flag operation in BiH would be crucial in determining its success. However, Karcic points out that the West currently faces several challenges.
At the outset, the international community’s focus is divided. With NATO and the EU preoccupied with Ukraine, concerns over a new administration under U.S. President Donald Trump, and Europe’s own defense shortcomings, their ability to respond decisively to instability in the Balkans may be limited.
“For example, the international community failed to react and refuses to openly hold Belgrade accountable for the incident in the Banjska Monastery – a foiled but highly serious attempt by criminals linked to Belgrade to destabilize Kosovo – despite overwhelming evidence,” he writes.
“Moreover, the international community pursues inconsistent policies. Western powers have often struggled to present a united front on BiH, with some EU countries like France and Germany prioritizing stability over justice and reforms. Meanwhile, U.S.President Joe Biden’s policy of ‘detaching’ Serbia from Russia, and consequently RS, has been a complete failure,” he adds.
Then he explains that Serbia has not only “deceived” these actors but has also “used the legitimacy it gained from the U.S. and the EU to intensify repression against any form of opposition to Vucic‘s regime.”
“All the while, it continues to receive EU investments and maintains cordial relations with Moscow and Beijing,” he adds.
He then poses the question: if RS were to declare independence, who would respond?
He explains that the Armed Forces of BiH (AFBiH) cannot act without a unanimous decision from all three members of the Presidency and that the member from RS “would never vote to deploy the country’s forces against his own entity.” Furthermore, given that Darko Culum, a former Minister of the Internal Affairsof RS, heads the State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA), it is unlikely that special forces would be deployed to prevent the entity from declaring independence.
“Based on my observations as a journalist who has worked in BiHfor the past twenty years, all politicians from RS, regardless of party affiliation, pledge their loyalty first and foremost to RS, not to BiH. Many of them have even publicly expressed their disregard for, and in some cases outright hatred toward, the country,” Karcic emphasizes.
Deactivating the Balkan powder keg
Karcic assesses that EUFOR, the EU’s peacekeeping mission, is unlikely to respond effectively to a crisis because it has only around 600 troops, mostly reservists without heavy equipment or military experience.
Similarly, NATO’s headquarters in Sarajevo has a limited mandate, focusing on providing assistance and advice in the country’s military reform process rather than taking direct action. In other words, NATO would have to deploy a rapid reaction force if it decided to intervene. A number of high-ranking NATO generals are undoubtedly closely monitoring developments in BiH. They would advocate for a swift response. However, Karcicpoints out that the question remains “whether all 32 NATO members would vote to send forces to maintain peace in a small area outside NATO territory.”
“For me, the answer is yes. Not because there is any love between NATO and non-member BiH, but because the last thing NATO needs is another Abkhazia, this time located between two NATO members (Croatia and Montenegro),” he argues.
Karcic states that certain measures need to be urgently prioritized “before things spiral out of control.”
First and foremost, he believes that EUFOR’s presence should be increased to the level of a brigade, emphasizing that a more visible EUFOR presence in BiH – through joint military exercises, a public military presence, and counter-disinformation campaigns – would deter Russian activity.
The second approach is bilateral military cooperation. Karcic cites the long-standing military partnership with the Maryland National Guard as an example – “The U.S. can strengthen this existing cooperation, which would send a very strong message to Moscow.”
Furthermore, he argues that NATO’s headquarters in Sarajevo must increase its public visibility and take concrete steps to promote the political, economic, and social benefits of joining the alliance. “Simply organizing closed roundtables and meetings about the need for military reform in BiH has proven fruitless. Cybersecurity and disinformation advisors need to be embedded in key ministries and agencies to provide support,” he writes.
“Enhanced support for BiH‘s central government, judiciary, and security apparatus could mitigate vulnerabilities. These institutions must be reformed to prevent their capture or obstruction by nationalist Bosnian Serbs or Bosnian Croats,” Karcic adds.
A dangerous precedent
In conclusion, Karcic warns that BiH “risks a Lebanon-like scenario” if it is left at the mercy of ethnic veto-driven agendas.
“A Russian-backed false flag operation in BiH is a likely scenario, and the secession of RS would not only destabilize BiH but would also set a dangerous precedent for other frozen conflicts in Europe,” he warns.
He explains that BiH shares borders with two NATO members – Croatia and Montenegro – and that any conflict in the country would have a spillover effect, entangling the transatlantic alliance.
“Ultimately, to prevent this outcome, the international community must remain vigilant, proactive, and united in its support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of BiH. Only through strong preventive measures can the region avoid becoming the next stage for Russia’s geopolitical games,” Karcic writes.
