In the summer of 1995, through several joint operations of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ARBiH), the Croatian Army (HV), and the Croatian Defence Council (HVO), the conditions were created for establishing the General Framework Agreement for Peace in BiH.
BiH media will, in the coming days, publish a series of articles dedicated to the 30th anniversary of the Dayton Peace Agreement.
Just as German Field Marshal Erich von Manstein described his military campaigns as lost victories in the book of the same name, the wartime operations carried out in the summer and autumn of 1995 on the territory of the then RBiH could similarly be described.
With the signing of the Split Declaration on July 22nd, 1995, the process of joint planning of strategic operations of ARBiH, HV, and HVO against the Army of Republika Srpska (VRS) began.
Viewed more broadly, the prerequisites for the Split Declaration were created in the autumn of 1994, when the forces of the 7th Corps of ARBiH enabled the HVO to enter Kupres, thus liberating the territory from which the largest operations of the HV during 1995 would be launched.
The entry of HV forces meant continuous fire support to all joint operations, which would become increasingly important as liberation operations were launched one after another.
Overview of the warring sides in the summer of 1995
During the summer of 1995, the balance of forces was completely changed, whereby the warring sides had new tasks as well as capabilities. The ARBiH in the summer of 1995 had six corps and 230.000 soldiers and approximately 120 maneuver brigades, and never before a greater supply of war materials and technical means, although still without significant armored forces.
The officer cadre of the Army, especially staff officers, during 1994 gained experience in carrying out combat operations of tactical and operational rank in conditions of war with the Yugoslav Army, the VRS, the Serbian Army of Krajina (SVK), the paramilitary formations of Fikret Abdic, the HVO, and the HV.
The Washington Agreement facilitated the supply of ammunition and weapons, which for the Army meant great relief in planning new operations. However, the key change in the structure and maturation of the Army refers to the decision of the military leadership to adopt, during the winter of 1994 to 1995, the formation concept of operational groups.
The corps, as central formation units, remained, but the focus of all operations would be carried by operational groups composed of several brigades and other auxiliary branches. In this way, the Army’s forces gained flexibility both in offensive and defensive operations.
In relation to the Army, HVO forces had completely different capacities, abilities, and composition in the summer of 1995. In total, there were approximately 40.000 soldiers in 30 brigades divided into four operational zones.
HVO forces, during the period from 1993 to the summer of 1995, showed weak and limited abilities in independently conducting operations of operational rank, focusing on defensive operations and occasional offensive actions and battles of tactical rank. Viewed more broadly, after the entry of the HV into the territory of the RBiH with the aim of creating preconditions for Operation “Storm,” HVO forces mostly acted as auxiliary forces in the operations “Leap-1,” “Leap-2,” “Winter-94,” and “Summer-95.”
The Serbian forces, both of the VRS and the SVK, in the summer of 1995, looked significantly different compared to the first years of the war. In the military-police operation “Storm,” the SVK was completely defeated, except for the 11th Eastern Slavonian Corps. All the equipment of the SVK withdrawn in early August 1995 to the occupied territory of RBiH fell into the hands of the VRS.
On the other hand, after the capture of the enclaves of Zepa and Srebrenica in the summer of 1995 and the commission of the most severe war crimes and genocide, the VRS controlled between 65 and 70 percent of the state territory of RBiH. However, the joint operations of the HV, HVO, and the Army during the spring and summer of 1995 almost completely broke the forces of the 2nd Krajina Corps of the VRS, which would have strategic implications for all liberation operations of the Army, HV, and HVO forces.
September liberation operations
The originally planned operation of the 5th Corps of the Army was supposed to begin by the end of August, but due to the strengthening of the VRS forces with equipment and manpower withdrawn from the SVK, the situation changed significantly.
After the deblockade of the Una-Sana Canton (USC), the artillery units of the HV were deployed to provide support to the Army forces, which, from the previously encircled Bihac pocket, would launch an operation with the goal of joining the main Army forces, that is, the 7th Corps.
However, the 5th Corps was organizationally understrength for an operation of the scale envisioned in Operation “Sana-95.” In the summer of 1995, the corps under the command of General Atif Dudakovic had approximately 16.000 soldiers, and with seven brigades, it could hardly have independently reached the valley of the Sana River, which was the target of the operation.
On the other hand, the launch of Operation “Maestral” in coordination with HV, HVO, and the 7th Corps forces from September 8th to 15th, with the engagement of all Army corps to tie up VRS forces, enabled Operation “Sana-95” to begin on September 13th with some delay. Thus, the focus of all liberation operations shifted to the area of Western Bosnia, that is, Bosanska Krajina.
Because of the engagement of units from several Army corps and the strategic importance that all the operations jointly had, it was necessary to bring reinforcements from all Army corps to the area of Bosanska Krajina.
Meanwhile, in Operation “Maestral,” the 7th Corps forces on September 14th liberated Donji Vakuf and, together with HV and HVO forces, liberated Jajce. Also, HV and HVO forces in an unstoppable offensive of the 4th and 7th Guards Brigades liberated Sipovo and Drvar.
The 5th Corps forces broke through the VRS defense line on September 13th, noting that part of the units from the Drvar and Glamoc area were directed toward the 5th Corps forces, which made the Croatian strike more effective.
The 5th Corps forces liberated Bosanski Petrovac on September 14th, then Kljuc on September 15th, and Bosanska Krupa on September 17th. What is important to point out is that after the contact between the HV forces and the 5th Corps forces at the Ostrelj pass, the Croatian forces switched to defense, which significantly complicated the situation for the 5th Corps forces.
The remnants of the shattered 2nd Krajina Corps of the VRS merged with the 1st Krajina Corps, which numbered more than 120.000 soldiers, with a zone of responsibility from Bosanska Krajina to Posavina. The striking power of the corps consisted of the 1st and 2nd Armored Brigades, which were moved to the critical points of the advance of the Army, HV, and HVO forces.
After the Croatian forces halted their advances, the overstretched 5th Corps forces suffered blows from the consolidated VRS forces, which received reinforcements daily. On September 17th, forces from the 7th Corps, led by the 17th Krajina Knight Brigade, reached Bosanska Krajina, where they, through superhuman efforts, defended Kljuc in battles that almost resulted in the fall of the liberated town.
At that time began the major maneuver of Army forces from all corps toward Bosanska Krajina to preserve the achieved gains of the 5th Corps forces, which were under attack, causing withdrawals in several sectors. The consolidated Army forces in Bosanska Krajina were divided into two groups so that the main 5th Corps forces were redirected northward toward Sanski Most and Prijedor, while the 7th Corps forces would defend Kljuc.
Political appetites in September 1995
While the Army forces were enduring the strongest attacks on the achieved lines, the HV General Staff launched Operation “Una-95” on September 18th, considered the most controversial operation of the HV.
It should be noted that in the last third of September and early October, all military achievements were to be fitted into the agreed framework of the Contact Group 51:49, which also satisfied the Serbian side. From September 18th to 21st, the Air Force and Air Defense of the VRS were allowed to attack the 5th and 7th Corps forces of the Army, as well as HV forces near Bosanski Novi and Bosanska Dubica.
In the unprepared Operation “Una-95,” which the Croatian military-political leadership launched under pressure from the United States (U.S.), whose officials were convinced that the Army forces would not withstand the pressure of the VRS, the Croatian forces lost 49 soldiers and officially ended the operation on September 19th.
Despite Richard Holbrooke’s motivation for HV forces to capture Prijedor and Sanski Most but not advance toward Banja Luka, the Croatian military leadership abandoned the northern direction across the Una River.
While the Army forces were defending their positions with ultimate effort, in Split on September 19th, a delegation of the RBiH led by President Alija Izetbegovic met with a delegation of Croatia led by Franjo Tudjman.
“Through our military actions, we have almost reached the 51:49 formula, and now we must accept the cessation of offensive operations and accept political dialogue. If we continue the offensive toward Banja Luka, there will be no peace process,” Tudjman told Izetbegovic at that time.
According to the testimony of Tudjman’s chief negotiator, Hrvoje Sarinic, Izetbegovic responded to Tudjman’s statement by saying, “We might still take Sanski Most.”
On the ground, in the last five days of September, a war drama unfolded along the advance routes of the 5th Corps forces, which were reinforced by units from other corps. However, around September 25th and 26th, due to the exhaustion of forces, the disconnection of defense lines, and the attrition of units, the VRS forces endangered the northern wing of the Army’s advance.
The VRS forces launched a large counteroffensive along a wide front from Mrkonjic Grad and Kljuc to Sanica-Luscani Palanka and even Bosanska Krupa. In these crucial moments for the Army forces, artillery support was provided by HV units. Finally, on October 8th, HV forces launched Operation “Southern Move,” attacking from the south the VRS forces defending Mrkonjic Grad, which reduced the pressure on the Army forces.
With extreme efforts and disciplinary measures, the 5th Corps forces on October 10th launched a counteroffensive with the goal of liberating Sanski Most. On the night of October 10th to 11th, the Army forces liberated Sanski Most, which caused a sudden collapse of morale among the VRS forces, while the advance of Croatian forces was halted on October 11th.
Although the ceasefire came into effect on October 12th at midnight, fighting continued, albeit at a lower intensity, until October 15th, when separation zones were established, after which the fortification of positions began.
Of all the 5th Corps units, the deepest advance as of October 15th was achieved by the 505th Knight Buzim Brigade, which reached the Ljubija mine, less than 10 kilometers from Prijedor.
Thus, the war in BiH ended, with the military phase continuing in the form of diplomatic battles, negotiations, and operations that created the framework for signing the Dayton Agreement.
Without the support of HV forces, the operations of the Army units would certainly not have achieved the success that was reached. In the context of operations aiming to liberate Banja Luka and Prijedor, despite the shaken morale of VRS units, which mercenaries from Serbia were forcing back to the front with beatings, the liberation of these cities would have been a military task at the limits of possibility, and without the support of HV, such an operation would have been extremely difficult to carry out.
Finally, regardless of all military victories, peace was achieved through negotiations that established clear frameworks and possibilities for all liberation operations even before they began, Klix.ba writes.
