For the past year, Haifa and other northern Israeli cities have endured significant destruction from Hezbollah’s rocket attacks. Despite the presence of the Iron Dome system, Haifa’s missile defense remains insufficient.
Since Hezbollah re-engaged in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on October 7th last year, all northern Israeli cities have been constant targets of rocket attacks. Although heavy media censorship hides information related to casualties and damage among Israeli soldiers and civilians, these attacks continue to increase the toll of victims daily.
Israel’s powerful missile defense systems, including the Iron Dome on land and its naval counterpart, have struggled to respond effectively to the numerous attacks.
Namely, the Iron Dome was designed as a territorial defense system to intercept short-range artillery rockets and shells of various calibers. Both the land-based and maritime (C-Dome) versions have an estimated range of about 70 kilometers. The system’s success rate has improved from 80% in its initial iterations to about 85%.
When the enemy launches rockets or artillery shells, the Iron Dome’s radars track their flight paths and predict their trajectories. If the system determines that the projectiles will land in the sea, desert, or uninhabited areas, it does not intercept them.
However, the greatest challenge to Haifa’s missile defense comes from Hezbollah’s use of multi-barrel rocket launchers, which were once imported but are now produced domestically in underground facilities. These launchers, inspired by Soviet Katyusha rockets, have high initial velocities and short ranges.
These two parameters are key when considering the limited capabilities of the Iron Dome: the flight duration is too short, and at least 12 rockets are fired from a single launcher, often from multiple firing points, leading to saturation or system overload.
The high launch speed of more than 350 meters per second allows these rockets to travel up to 10 kilometers in less than a minute, depending on the proximity of Hezbollah’s positions to Israeli territory. On the other hand, the shorter the flight, the less time Israeli radars have to issue warnings, limiting civilians’ ability to take cover, which further increases the lethality of Hezbollah attacks.
In the end, even when successful interceptions occur, Israel incurs significant costs. Each Tamir missile used by the Iron Dome costs 70.000 dollars, whereas Hezbollah’s multiple rocket launcher missiles cost only a few hundred dollars.
When it comes to drones, the Iron Dome is not the primary defense. Instead, the Barak or Spyder systems target these threats. However, drones pose significant challenges due to their small size, low flight profiles, and reduced radar visibility. Many of these drones are launched from ramps that provide them with initial acceleration.
The greatest danger from drones – especially kamikaze drones – lies in their payloads, with some carrying warheads weighing between 15 and 300 kilograms of explosives.
While fighter jets and air-to-air missiles like the Sidewinder can be used to intercept drones, this approach is not cost-effective in the long term, given the relatively low production costs of Hezbollah’s drones.
Ultimately, Israel’s only viable solution to protect Haifa and other northern cities is to push Hezbollah north of the Litani River, as stipulated by United Nations (UN) Resolution 1701, because from that distance, threats can be detected and addressed more effectively.
In simple terms, the longer a rocket or drone remains in flight, the higher the chances of it being intercepted, Klix.ba writes.
E.Dz.
